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FOREWORD
THE DELAYED RETURN OF PRODIGAL SONS:
REFLECTIONS ON THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Martin Butora*
Over the past two years, hundreds of people have come through my
office, the Human Rights Section of the Office of the President of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), to report human rights
abuses perpetrated by the previous regimes. Notice that I say regimes,
not regime. The victims have approached us with matters connected
not only to the communist system, but also to the Nazi occupation pe-
riod, and the immediate post-war years as well. They come with a deep
feeling that the powers of the time committed a great injustice upon
them or their families; all of them present indisputable claims that jus-
tice must now be done. Many of them demand restitution of property
or financial compensation in addition to moral or personal vindication.
Some of them bring contemporary complaints: the rate of change is too
slow and the old power structures and mafias continue to exist, or
newly adopted legislation discriminates against them. Still others have
come only to share their feelings of despair and injustice: to relate the
traumas of lost years of their lives and wasted opportunities.
Unfortunately, many of these people leave my office unsatisfied or
disappointed. Sometimes they walk away empty handed because their
* Martin Butora, Ph.D. is the Advisor to the President of Czechoslovakia for
Human Rights. He obtained his Ph.D. in sociology from Comenius University, Brati-
slava, in 1980. Mr. Butora is also a researcher, writer and politician. He is the author
of four novels and several television and film scripts. In addition, he was one of the
original founders of the political movement Public Against Violence (PAV) in Slovakia
in 1989, and a member of the Coordinating Committe of PAV (the Slovak sister or-
ganization to the Czech Civic Forum).
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concerns simply were not within the jurisdiction of the President. More
often, however, these people are discouraged because it is extremely
difficult to remedy their grievances. The totalitarian or authoritarian
systems produced mountains of suffering and injustice but to right
these wrongs today could have harmful effects. How far back should
we go to correct the wrongs of the past, notwithstanding the despair-
ingly limited resources of the state to meet the demands of "the hum-
ble and the offended?"
The investigation into the facts of these claims is the study of the
collisions between human lives. Human fates collide with each other in
much the same way that the fates of nations have collided and inter-
mingled to create the firestorm which is the history of Central and
Eastern Europe. If it is true, as someone once said, that Europe has
produced more history than it can bear, then here, in this corner of
Europe, that is doubly true.
Indeed, this territory presents a mosaic of so many mutually inter-
locked nations, that political formations arise only with difficulty, and
very often, as obstacles to each other. One event strikes a second; the
victory of one is a defeat or a detriment to the other, even though it
should have been clear long ago that victory or defeat can never be
definitive here. This region cannot tolerate victory in the manner of the
North over the South in the American Civil War. It is certainly no
coincidence that today's freely elected Hungarian parliament consists
of not only authors and philosophers but also about forty historians.
Moreover, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and De-
fense Minister are also historians.
The generation whose representatives or descendants present them-
selves at the doors of our office, what has this generation has lived
through?
* The expulsion of the Czechs and the Slovaks from their homes after the Mu-
nich and Vienna accords;
* The Nazi terror after the occupation of the land in 1939, forced labor in
Germany;
* The Aryanization of Jewish property and the deportation of the Jews;
* The concentration camps;
* The participation in the war of the Slovak State on the German side;
* The Nazi brutality during the suppression of the Slovak National Uprising;
* The activity of domestic quislings.
Furthermore, especially when the fronts changed, this generation ex-
perienced other excesses:
* The forced dragging away to the Soviet Union of individuals who were not
necessarily traitors or collaborators with Nazism;
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" The "wild transfer" of Germans after the war;
" The application of the principle of collective guilt on the German as well as
the Hungarian minorities and the evacuation of Germans from their homes;
* The transfer of Hungarians;
* The Communist takeover in 1948;
" The Stalinist terror under Gottwald, camps, trials and executions;
The suppression of Slovak "bourgeois nationalism";
* The forced collectivization of agriculture;
" The expropriation of property;
" Political screening and expelling people from work;
* The Soviet occupation and the subsequent period of "normalization";
* The persecution of the Charter 77 signatories and other dissidents;
* The suppression of religious life;
* The corruption of high party officials and state officials, thievery of the state;
* The "Truncheon Law" of 1988, which gave police the right to strike
protesters;
* The break up of demonstrations in 1988 and 1989 in Bratislava and Prague;
* The all encompassing power of State Security hunting for collaborators among
tens of thousands of acquiescent and accommodating, but also broken and
blackmailed.
Against this backdrop were continuous emigrations and escapes, first
from the Nazis and then from the Communists.
For the past two years we have been living in the new era of history
which many had given up hope of ever seeing: the era of post-commu-
nism. Political scientists, sociologists, and sovietologists have been de-
bating for a long time which type of regime should replace Stalinism.
Suggestions have included post-totalitarian, post-totalitarian authorita-
rianism, post-revolutionary totalitarianism, welfare authoritarianism,
welfare authoritarianism, neo-traditionalism, and so on. Experts are
discussing what frame of reference would be the best from which to
understand and study the departure of communism from history. At
the same time, politicians from the new governments are facing an ur-
gent practical task: What is the best and most expedient way in which
to build fashion a new political, economic and legislative order? This
leaves for the lawyers and legislators such important questions as:
* Should the passage to a new regime be understood in the context of moderni-
zation or in the frame of theories of devolution?
* Was the collapse of the communist system a result of a crisis of legitimacy?
* Is this a transition through transaction or is it a transition through
withdrawal?
* Is this a a case of revolution or only of restoration?
In any case, it is obvious that rebuilding, or in some cases establishing,
a law-abiding state and more generally, the rule of law, is a monumen-
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tal challenge. As President Vaclav Havel said in his 1992 New Year's
speech,
History has confronted us with a completely unprecedented task: to find our-
selves anew, at a time when no foreign power threatens us, when no one inter-
feres in our affairs, when for the first time in centuries we truly hold our future
in our own hands. At the moment, we are in the middle of this search. We do not
want to go back, we cannot go back and in any case we have nowhere to go back
to. No wonder that society is spread with unrest, anxiety, fears, doubts, and, at
times, even despondency. This is more than natural. After all, even Christ him-
self on the cross had doubts about the meaning of his path.
Even though some observers warn that the current transition is oc-
curring in the midst of a severe worldwide recession, no one doubts the
basic political orientation of the worldwide transition processes: democ-
ratization in the late 20th century includes dozens of countries on four
continents (Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia). Ervin Krauze
pointed out that we are witnessing "the highest degree of maturity that
Latin America has attained in this century," with the lapse of four
"classical" paradigms that dominated Latin American history - mili-
tarism, revolutionary and academic Marxism, demagogic populism and
the closed economy. We have observed the decline of dictatorships in
Africa, as well as the search for a post-civil war consensus in Asia. The
collapse of communism calls for a rebirth of Charles de Gaulle's vision
of "Europe to the Urals." It paves the way for what Zbigniew Brzezin-
ski prophecied as "a community that would circle the globe eastward
from Vancouver to Vladivostok."
Data assembled by Freedom House clearly confirms this global trend
over the last 15 years: the proportion of "free" and "partially free"
states has been steadily increasing. In 1974, just over one-half of the
one-hundred sixty-two states regularly surveyed could be considered
free or partially free. By 1987, the figure had moved to two-thirds. The
events of 1989 and 1990 only improved these proportions in accordance
with a "democratic domino effect" (Hubert Starr), including the pro-
cess of emulation, demonstration or modelling that has been occurring.
A special risk, however, is connected to the vastness of the region as
well as the greatness of the task. Central and Eastern Europe reaches
so far that it touches practically all of the "burning topics" of present
world politics: the role of Islam; the role of unified Germany; the posi-
tion of the emerging nation states; the question of hunger, or broadly,
the confrontation between the rich and the poor; and the global envi-
ronmental and resource crisis. The space of disintegration in the neigh-
borhood of Western Europe until now does not have its face, does not
have its clearly formulated ideology, a unifying principle: democracy is
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often more a wishful vision or a proclamation than a reality. Also,
there is no evident power center that would coordinate, and in certain
measures, control the others.
Nevertheless, as President Havel says, "we are on the way." The
following is a brief summary of some obstacles and snares that may be
encountered on this complicated path towards democracy.
There are many levels of the democratization process that one can
study: political democracy; democracy and the market economy; exter-
nal environment and security guarantees; and the building of civic soci-
ety. This foreword just briefly touches the first level.
At first glance, the governments have achieved a great deal. The new
democratically elected parliaments are working toward political plural-
ism, free and independent medias are exercising their "watchdog" role
over governments, and constitutional courts are already active in some
countries. Nevertheless, a post-communist period of chaos is more typi-
cal than a smoothly functioning system. So we also see an erosion of
state authority, parliamentary obstructionism, popular hostility to poli-
ticians of all types and to politics in general, signs of anomie illustrated
by increasing criminality, and low voter turnout in elections.
There are many factors, some typical of the transition from totalitar-
ian rule to democracy, that make the transition period more complex.
1. Fragility of New Democracies
First, the general fragility of the new democracies still exists. This
does not necessarily mean that there is an acute threat of overthrowing
the democracies, but rather, that the democracies could be determined
to be ineffective and even unjust. I mention here only one, seemingly
marginal phenomenon: the broadcasting of parliamentary sessions on
national television. Many citizens are simply disgusted with the discus-
sions and quarrels. This is what we wanted? - they ask themselves.
After the outpouring of revolutionary euphoria, people are now seeing
that the normal political struggle encompasses unfairness and routine.
Others find the parliament a "national theater" (Gyorgy Konrad), like
watching a play more than watching people at work. And, by the way,
in the Hungarian as well as in the Slovak parliament, there has been on
display a situation that belongs more to farce than to the democratic
process: a member of parliament has not only placed his vote, but
leaned over and pushed the voting button of his absent neighbor, with
the helpful explanation that he knows the MP's opinions anyway.
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2. Fragmentation
A very high rate of fragmentation is endemic in this period, at all
levels of social and political life. An excessive desire to exercise auton-
omy is prevalent. Many lower levels of governments, whether they are
municipalities, districts, communities, towns, regions, or republics, are
grasping for greater powers and looking to increase their range of con-
trol. Often, they act without regard for the public good and the inter-
ests, functions, welfare and prosperity of society as a whole. The "verti-
cal dimension" is overrated and the associating mechanisms on the
horizontal level are missing or are insufficient. Obviously, this does not
encourage people to cooperate or teach the representatives and admin-
istrators how to concentrate and accumulate resources. In Budapest,
the twenty-two districts of the city tried to be autonomous that the
Mayor's jurisdiction would have been drastically limited. Prague and
Bratislava are undergoing similar changes.
3. Political Atomization
An even more unpleasant side of this development is the atomization
of the political life scene. As De Gaulle once said, it is difficult to gov-
ern the nation that knows some three-hundred varieties of cheese. It is
at least as troublesome to rule in a country that moved from a one
party system to a country having more than one-hundred political par-
ties and movements. Such is the case in Czechoslovakia before the June
1992 parliamentary elections; forty parties are running in the June
elections. It is well-known that the most recent elections in Poland
brought twenty-nine parties to the parliament, but it is probably not so
widely known that further ruptures and divisions are underway. The
social base of many parties is rather unclear and it is all too typical
that soon after the elections, many so-called "independent" representa-
tives and new parties emerge.
A recent example of this occurred in Czechoslovakia, where in the
spring of 1992, both the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Fed-
eral Parliament changed their political garb and joined the Social
Democrats, a party which was not able to enter the parliament in the
June 1990 elections. Similarly, the Movement for Democratic Slovakia
(HZDS), the party with the highest public opinion ratings in the cur-
rent pre-election polls, is only another attempt to repeat an "umbrella
organization" principle on an even wider and more inconsistent basis
than in the previous elections. But what counts, above all, is the oppor-
tunity to become a part of the parliament.
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Needless to say, it is extremely complicated under these circum-
stances to create coalitions, to appoint the government, and, more gen-
erally, to reach the consensus that is vitally important for the continua-
tion of the reforms. Indeed the Spanish model, based on the Moncloa
Palace Pact of 1977, signed by Prime Minister Gonzales, the parlia-
mentary parties, the left-wing opposition, and the trade unions, was an
unrealistic dream, despite the fact that some remarkable progress has
been made in developing tripartite parties in countries such as
Czechoslovakia.
4. New Social Actors
Unlike southern Europe or Latin America, most of the post-commu-
nist countries face an incredibly demanding task: to create new social
actors for the current changes, new protagonists for the reforms, and a
new middle-class of owners. In the past, the political forms and institu-
tions that have been created in the course of revolutions have only been
reflections of the already existing economic processes and relations. As
a rule, these political configurations have corresponded to the interests
of the existing social classes and stratas. Currently, we see the con-
trary: the revolution and especially the post-revolution legislature
comes as a spiritual agent, and ascends to the throne not only as a
lawmaker but also, to a certain extent, as a procreator of new social
classes.
5. Coping with the Past
All post-authoritarian or post-totalitarian regimes experience, in one
way or another, the problem of coping with the past. It is like sailing
between Scylla and Charybdis - it is simply impossible to satisfy ev-
eryone. Coping with the past consumes a great deal of personal energy
and resources. The preoccupation with the past can prevent coping with
the present and the future.
In general, the character of the transformation influences the balanc-
ing of ethical needs and political constraints. The greater the frequency
of negotiations concerning the transition to democracy, the greater the
prospects for reconciliation. In cases where the collapse of a system
leaves a divided society, the discussions are more ardent, the "persecu-
tion syndrome" is more highly developed, and the resistance of the "old
structures" is more stubborn.
The Czechoslovak law known as "lustration," screening public ser-
vants for possible connections to the State Security force, the malevo-
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lent power structure of the former regime, has had its passionate sup-
porters as well as its embittered opponents. The law applies to elected,
appointed or assigned officials in high-level positions in the state admin-
istration, and members of the army, police, and other such institutions.
Some people criticize the reliability of the State Security data. They
feel that lustration is harmful to them and they claim their innocence.
Other people state that they were not aware of being registered as col-
laborators. They request court procedures to deal individually with
each case of involuntary cooperation, such as in the case of blackmail
or other types of forced compliance. The law is also problematic be-
cause it holds former high-ranking functionaries of the Communist
Party accountable for their actions. Among them are individuals who
later changed their opinions, having been engaged themselves in dis-
sent, or as active participants in the "Prague Spring" reform movement
of 1968.
The fate of lustration is unclear. A number of cases under this law
have occupied the attention of the public and media, and one can ex-
pect that the impact of the law will be exaggerated, used, and misused
in the election campaign. President Havel, while deeply aware of the
necessity to cope with the past and to conduct some moral accounting,
is rather reluctant to support the current version of the law and has
proposed several amendments. Also, ninety-nine deputies of the Federal
Assembly petitioned the newly formed Constitutional Court requesting
the invalidation of the lustration law. This controversial dispute will not
be resolved by the Constitutional Court before the June 1992 elections.
6. Frustrated Expectations
Predictably, two or three years after the revolution, the feelings of
disillusionment, dissatisfaction, apathy and distrust are widespread. To
a certain extent, the radical appearance of some proponents of lustra-
tion is a result of their frustrated expectations. Many of the disillu-
sioned believe that the removal of the members of the old structures
from their positions of power is slow or is not taking place at all. They
claim that the former "mafias" are raising their heads again, now hav-
ing legalized their stolen capital. The starting line, they say, has not
been equal for all: the former aparatchiks and other obscure, morally
dubious persons devoted to the previous regime have had advantages.
For example, in the small privatization program underway, they argue,
one can hardly speak of an "equal opportunity" principle.
This is only one source of apathy. The disenchantment, similar to the
phenomenon of "el desencanto" (disillusionment) in Latin America in
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its first years of democratization, is also connected to rising unemploy-
ment and diminishing buying power. Regardless of the fact that the
new leaders were elected through democratic procedures, many of their
former voters today do not believe in them and consider them egoistic,
arrogant, incompetent or corrupt. The old unhappy controversy be-
tween "WE" and "THEM" surfaces again. All this creates, as Samuel
Huntington convincingly described, an "authoritarian nostalgia" where
people lead themselves to believe that the previous era was perhaps bet-
ter after all.
Even if the political mood in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary is
far from ecstatic, public opinion polls show that the majority of the
population does not dream of restoring the non-functioning communist
system. The daily television reports from other East European countries
and states, especially those from the former Soviet Union and from the
Yugoslavian states, contribute to the "raising of consciousness" of the
inhabitants. This may come as a surprise to some, but the majority of
the population in each of these three countries believes that the condi-
tions over the past two years are "getting better."
One of the inevitable consequences of authoritarian nostalgia is a
popular demand for "real" leaders. The citizens hunger for men and
women who would reduce their stress, their feelings of uncertainty and
their cognitive dissonance. This hunger for order opens the door to pop-
ulism. Populist proposals always sound attractive, but the important
question is, how will the so-called "Silent Majority" react to them? If
the populist vectors move the majority of the voters to the populist poli-
ticians, then this silent majority becomes dead weight on the changing
society. This is especially dangerous where populism leads to
nationalism.
7. Nationalism
The phenomenon of nationalism is undoubtedly a serious threat to
the establishment of a healthy and stable political democracy. This
danger has already been widely analyzed, so that today we know plenty
about the possible Lebanonization of the Balkans and the Balkaniza-
tion of East Central Europe. Nationalism has lead to Vietnam-style
conflicts and Afghan-like wars in some states of the former Soviet
Union; it may lead to the possible Quebecization or Belgium-like
hyphening processes in parts of the post-communist world. Most impor-
tantly, from nationalism we have seen war and violence with all its
cruelty, irrationality, and hatred.
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From a global perspective, it is useful to consider the current trend
as the final stage of swollen nationalism that has emerged after the
crash of the great empires, especially following World War I. Thirty-
two new nation-states and eighteen autonomous regimes have been es-
tablished in the last ten years. Just since 1989, these acts of self-deter-
mination have improved the "nationality status" of over one-hundred
ninety million people, while some one million have been expelled or
forced into exile.
Recognizing this trend, it is crucial to learn how to cope with it.
Czech and Slovak politicians, for example, are criticized for participat-
ing in endless and tiresome negotiations about the future of their coex-
istence. I would prefer tiresome bargaining, any day, to the several
thousand deaths in Northern Ireland over the past twenty-two years, or
the hundreds of victims of attacks from Basque separatists in Spain.
We should keep in mind that some newly created states not only face
renewal but also a complete restatement of identity: they suddenly have
become the subjects of history, not the mere objects of their more pow-
erful neighbors. Some of them are not sufficiently prepared to operate
within this new identity. The violence evidenced in Serbo-Croatian and
Armenia-Azerbaijanian interaction is certainly not the only possible
form of dialogue. The democratic development of an independent
Ukraine as well as the positive engagement of unified Germany are
among many precursors to the future stability of post-communist
Europe.
International engagement at every possible level, such as in the
United Nations, the European Community, and the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe, is absolutely crucial. International
bodies should not only be utilized during times of war, but should also
be active parties to the resolution of peace-time problems, such as refu-
gee and other immigration issues. Even more vital is the re-evaluation
of the role of NATO. Its new role could be not only to provide defense
from outside dangers but also to provide security guarantees among its
member states. The Central and Eastern European states, which could
be integrated into NATO over time, would greatly appreciate this new
role for NATO.
Efforts have been made to draft international guarantees protecting
the position of national and ethnic minorities. Specifically, there are
attempts to guarantee minorities their free cultural and civic rights,
and good relations with their mother country, as well as to encourage
their loyalty to the state where they live and where they want to feel at
home. Here again, the internationalization of existing or prospective
disagreements is the most suitable tool for stability.
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8. Professional Administrators
Another critical problem is the severe shortage of professional senior
administrators in public service. The post-communist countries have
difficulty providing adequate responses to offers of assistance. Those in
public service are often incompetent, corrupt and undereducated. These
weaknesses pervade vital professions such as law, finance, and econom-
ics. While the average qualification potential is, at least in Czechoslo-
vakia, rather high, there are not enough managerial incentives to at-
tract and motivate sufficient numbers of qualified employees.
9. Political Culture
The political culture of the new leaders, parties, and decision-makers
must still be developed. A sense of balance is often missing. Among
other problems, the new leadership faces a number of dichotomies.
(a) The desired rapid rate of change and the necessary gradualism of
the transformation
Some issues simply cannot be solved immediately. Step-by-step pro-
cedures must be followed, and if an adequate solution is unavailable,
then the issue may have to be put aside for awhile. Desires for rapid
change are reflected in the colossal amount of parliamentary work
which has been accomplished. For example, the Hungarian parliament
has passed an average of one law each week and the Czechoslovak Fed-
eral Assembly has passed almost 170 laws during its first two years.
(b) Hesitancy in solving problems and impulsive changes
Another typical dilemma is hesitancy in solving problems. The help-
lessness and confusion of the Russian leadership on economic reform so
often mentioned by Bogomolov inhibits the progressive, pro-democratic
forces. In opposition to this hesitancy is the tendency to adopt sudden
radical measures (e.g., liberalization of prices) without the necessary
support mechanisms, implementation of which would take much more
time and effort.
(c) Instant liquidation of problems and bargaining over changes
Another controversy lies in the "syndrome of purification," the ten-
dency to liquidate a problem with a quick fix and then to follow liqui-
dation with a search for a definite solution. On the opposite end of the
spectrum are those solutions which call for negotiation and bargaining.
1992] 445
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Because of the time involved in negotiation, many politicians are eager
to adopt "purification" policies. Too many politicians are still unaware
that there are no definitive winners or losers in this region; and that
any "purification act" can, in the long run, prove to be counterproduc-
tive. On the contrary, the ability to work together with others, to find a
political consensus is a condition sine qua non for the future of
democracy.
(d) Balancing economic reform with social responsibility
The social dimension of reform is a problem in those nations where
the legislature focusses exclusively on economic reform. With the horri-
ble heritage of state paternalism, it is understandable that many au-
thorities stress the importance of the market, free trade and radical
economic reform. On the other hand, underestimating the social side of
reform can create a political atmosphere in which the population be-
comes critical not only of economic reform, but also of democracy as
such. The rebirth of social responsibility, the restoration of some basic
discipline in social life, the protection against the misuse of freedom -
these should all be priority items on each politician's agenda.
(e) Differentiating the government from the leaders
Finally, the determining factor as to whether a new democracy sur-
vives or not, as Huntington points out, is "not primarily the severity of
the problems [the leaders] face or their ability to solve these problems.
It is the way in which political leaders respond to their [own] inability
to solve the problems." For the public, it means the ability to "distin-
guish between the regime and the government of rulers." It logically
follows that the public is responsible for changing the leaders if its dis-
content is broad and general. The political leaders, on the other hand,
must be responsible for maintaining a steady and continuous dialogue
with the public. The leaders must also express ideas and policies clearly
and convincingly. Seemingly self-evident, it is unfortunately far from
obvious to many of the intellectual elite of the first generation of
leaders.
10. Positive Images of Democratization
What is urgently needed in politics are positive social patterns and
positive examples of the democratic transformation. The population
needs to see and believe that democratization is possible. I think
Brzezinski is correct when he considers it a central strategic priority
[VOL. 7:435
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"to ensure that Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia consummate a
successful, model transition to pluralistic democracy." As soon as these
countries join the ranks of the stable nations of Europe, they will serve
as positive role models for those still working toward stable democracy.
The ten points above, discussing the obstacles and problems in the
period of transition, deal more with mechanisms and principles than
with persons and human beings. It is not upon the principles alone,
though, that democracy is built. Democracy is not some Hegelian-like
fulfillment of an abstract thesis. Democracy is built for people, like
those who come to our Human Rights section seeking advice, empathy
and help. To minimize possible negative impact of well-intended demo-
cratic ideas and procedures, the policy makers must occasionally reflect
upon the goals of democracy. Those who govern must never forget that
politics and laws serve the people.
